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Introduction
timeframe. It examines each of the six steps of the kill chain (e.g., Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess, collectively known as the F2T2EA process) 2 and considers the actions a VNSA might employ to block that step. The central premise of this paper is that an enemy who can break even one link in the kill chain remains invulnerable to global strike.
To be clear from the outset, the purpose of this paper is not to question whether a global strike capability would be a valuable addition to the Air Force inventory, since such a system would unquestionably provide the President of 2035 with strategic options that President Obama does not currently possess. Instead, the intent of this Minority Report is to add a degree of balance to the optimistic tenor expected in the companion papers written my colleagues on the CSAT team. Ideally, the combined body of research will adeptly equip today's Air Force leadership to make long-term, high-dollar acquisition decisions regarding tomorrow's Global Strike capability.
What is Global Strike?
One of the early challenges faced by the CSAT team was to define exactly what we meant by "Global Strike." After much discussion and with considerable assistance from the The wording of this definition -which notably describes global strike not as a weapon, but rather as a set of capabilities -acknowledges two early conclusions by the team. First, a singular weapon would be unlikely to fully satisfy the specified requirement. For instance, a weapon devised to strike an orbiting satellite would likely be very different from one intended to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets. Likewise, neither of these weapons would be very useful for taking out a target in cyberspace whose physical location was unknown.
The definition also reflects the team's second conclusion: a weapon alone is insufficient to accomplish the global strike mission. As Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets confirms, four of these six processes (e.g., Find, Fix, Track, and Assess, but not Target or Engage) rely heavily on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. 3 In other words, our definition acknowledges that a global strike weapon without the supporting ISR capability is comparable to a lion without sight, hearing, and smell: the gazelle need not fear such a lion despite its razor-sharp teeth and claws.
Violent Non-State Actors -Are They Relevant To Global Strike?
Are VNSAs a viable target for global strike? The scope of the above definition (e.g., any target) clearly includes the full spectrum of non-state entities, ranging from large organizations that exhibit state-like behavior such as Hamas and Hezbollah, to large terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and Abu Nidal Organization, to criminal groups such as the Medellín Cartel, to the "evil genius" -an individual empowered through technology with vast destructive capability.
The scope also includes VNSAs consisting partially or entirely of American citizens and those composed of citizens of allied nations, in addition to the citizens of America's sworn enemies.
More importantly, such groups have proven to be a threat to U.S. national security, as reflected in President George W. Bush's speech to the U.S. Military Academy on 1 June 2002.
In it, Bush stated that "the gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology" and "even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations." 4 The President's statement reflected the sudden awakening to the dangers posed by the growing global network of VNSAs that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had caused: in a single day, 19 al Qaeda hijackers successfully transformed four civilian airliners into cruise missiles, resulting in 2,996 deaths and the destruction of U.S. infrastructure worth $16.2B.
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Although perhaps the most infamous attack, 9/11 hardly qualifies as a singularity. Admittedly, a large percentage of these groups could be excluded from consideration because they are located in faraway countries, they focus on local or regional issues, or they lack the means or motive to execute such a strike against the U.S. homeland. However, as the 19 hijackers demonstrated on 9/11, neither large numbers nor conventional arms are needed to conduct an effective strategic attack against America. Suffice it to say that dozens, perhaps hundreds, of entities -ranging in size from individuals to groups with thousands of memberscurrently possess the desire, if not the capability, to do grave harm to the U.S. To illustrate the concept of a noise floor and how to exploit it, consider how a stealth aircraft avoids radar detection. As anyone who has seen a stealthy aircraft knows, the aircraft itself is not invisible to the human eye; nor is it invisible to the pulses of electromagnetic energy emitted by radar trackers. Rather, stealth works by minimizing the energy reflected back to the tracking radar. This is accomplished by a variety of techniques, such as absorbing the energy within carbon composite components of the aircraft and reflecting it in other directions.
Nevertheless, some of the energy is reflected back to the tracking radar. Since other things in the vicinity of the radar (e.g., terrain, trees, buildings, cars, etc.) are also reflecting energy back at it, the system ignores signals below a certain threshold; otherwise the display would be littered with dozens of false targets. As long as the reflected energy from the stealthy aircraft remains below that threshold (a.k.a., the "noise floor"), the radar will not establish a track file on the aircraft and the radar operator will not see a blip on his screen where the aircraft should be. However, if the aircraft continues towards the radar, it will eventually reach a "burn-through" range where the reflected energy exceeds the radar's noise floor, causing the system to establish a track file on the aircraft and place a radar blip on the display. Pilots of stealth aircraft plan their missions to stay outside this burn-through range so that their radar signature stays below the tracking radar's noise floor.
Likewise, a VNSA can break the first link of the kill chain by simply staying below the noise floor of the collective ISR system. Osama bin Laden successfully evaded detection by the U.S. intelligence community for over 10 years by altering his tradecraft to minimize his emissions. He carefully avoided the use of cellular or satellite phones, relying instead on letters, videotaped messages, trusted agents, and personal meetings to communicate to other members of his terrorist network. He only associated with a very small circle of individuals that he trusted.
Admittedly, these measures did limit his autonomy and his ability to orchestrate a second 9/11, and America did ultimately find and kill him. Nevertheless, for 10 years, he was able to continue developing dastardly plans to harm our country.
Will such evasion be possible in the globally interconnected environment of 2035?
Admittedly, the answer to such a question is highly speculative, but examining recent technological trends, in conjunction with futurist literature, can guide such speculation. One can reasonably assume that computational capability, which has already transformed modern society, will continue to grow for the foreseeable future at similar rates. This means that computational power would continue to double every 18 months, in accordance with Moore's law, 11,12 while the cost of a transistor declines by half in approximately the same timeframe. 13 Based on these growth rates, one futurist, Michio Kaku, predicts that by 2035 much of the world will have entered the era of "ubiquitous computing," where computer chips have become "so cheap and plentiful that they would be scattered throughout the environment -in our clothing, our furniture, the walls, even our bodies. And they would all be connected to the Internet, sharing data."
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Another futurist, Ray Kurzweil, predicts that scientists will have designed "learning computers"
with "intelligence indistinguishable from that of biological humans" prior to 2030. 15 Such computers, which would be capable of mimicking the pattern recognition capabilities of the human brain, will be essential to sort through the mounds of ISR data available in 2035. Ibid, 59 . The average transistor price is halved aver 1.6 years (or 19.2 months). He proposes "microprocessor cost per transistor cycle," which is halved is every 1.1 years, as a "more accurate measure of price-performance because it takes into account both speed and performance" (62). 14 Kaku, Physics of the Future, 20. 15 Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 25. The author forecasts the development of software models that can mimic man's brain by the mid-2020s, and computer systems fully capable of emulating human intelligence before 2030.
As computer chips become cheaper, more ubiquitous, and more interconnected, the amount of data available to analysts will continue to grow exponentially. Kurzweil indicates the amount of data traffic on the Internet has "doubled every year" since 1990, which has also required exponential growth in the data transmission speed of the Internet backbone. 16 Even scientific knowledge "is exploding exponentially around us," doubling "every decade or so."
17
With millions -perhaps billions -of interconnected microchips embedded in everything from sofas to socks to skin, with each chip broadcasting to the 2035 equivalent of the Internet, one can easily imagine how such a growth trend in data might be sustained, or even accelerated.
This means that the intelligence community's challenge of sorting through these mounds of data to find a target of interest will be exacerbated by the fact that Internet traffic is increasing at a faster rate than computer processing power. With Internet traffic doubling every 12 months, compared to every 18 months for processor power, this difference may seem small at first glance; however, a more thorough analysis reveals that the mound of Internet data for analysts to sift through will have grown over 200 times more than processing capability by 2035. 18 In other words, although ISR analysts in 2035 will have far more computational horsepower for searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack, the amount of hay to sort through will have grown so much that the net effect may well be a decreased capability to find the needle -the challenge of finding VNSAs could be 200 times more difficult in 2035 than it is today.
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The VNSA can further decrease his probability of detection through a number of protective actions. The most significant action would be to simply stay off the cyber grid, at 16 Ibid, 80-81. 17 least for any nefarious activities. This will likely be much harder to do in the ubiquitous computing environment of 2035, but not impossible. To assume that tech-savvy criminals will be incapable of circumventing such chips would be the height of naivety. Such criminals might disable the broadcast capability of the chips, or disable the chips entirely by exposing them to microwaves or other forms of electromagnetic energy. Alternatively, they may physically block or electronically jam the chip's transmitters, preventing a connection to the grid. Another option would be to simply buy certified "chip-free" products, which, ironically, could become the premium products in stores around the world as consumer concerns about privacy grow.
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By 2035, video coverage of most urban areas is also likely to be ubiquitous. Video feeds from traffic cameras, ATM machines, private security systems, personal laptops, and cell phones will likely all be interconnected with the grid and made available to ISR analysts for review.
These data streams will be augmented by high-resolution global coverage from satellites and air vehicles, creating an environment akin to that seen in many science fiction movies, where the government is able to remotely observe the bad guy's every activity.
However, even in the movies, the first step is determining who to track. Today, law enforcement and intelligence specialists do that by surveilling suspects -both visually and electronically -and establishing a network of contacts, which are subsequently investigated to establish further interconnections. By 2035, computers with advanced facial recognition capabilities will be able to assist with building these connections and identifying the members of the various criminal and terror networks. Conceivably, such computers could use the various video streams to autonomously track a suspect, identify any "person of interest" that the suspect comes in contact with, and then track the new person of interest. Using the large volumes of 20 Although retailers such as Wal-Mart may want to track a consumer's every movement through their store to optimize marketing advertisements to the consumer's tastes, the consumer may not want to be tracked, and may pay extra to avoid it. historical video stored on the grid, analysts would also be able to work backwards in time to observe behavior and build a contact list for the new suspect. Likewise, analysts could also leverage historical video to work backwards from a significant event to determine who might have been in the area prior to the event and to identify places that these individuals frequented.
Analysts have already leveraged similar "point of origin" capabilities -albeit on a far more rudimentary level -in support of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, to identify insurgents responsible for implanting improvised explosive devices.
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Unfortunately, the lack of ubiquitous video makes this a more difficult problem for today's analysts.
Ironically, the sheer volume of video data generated by the various sources listed above also creates a challenge in finding tomorrow's VNSAs. Although this data clearly benefits the government once a member of the VNSA has been flagged, it benefits the VNSA prior to the flagging. Like the volumes of computer data described above, the mounds of video become the background noise in which the VNSA can hide. As long as the VNSA keeps the signature of his nefarious activities below the noise floor, he will be out-prioritized by other, less-circumspect criminals.
As noted earlier, the size of a VNSA can vary from very large groups to very small ones.
For the purposes of evasion, smaller groups will generally have an advantage over larger ones since smaller groups will tend to have smaller emissions that can be flagged by the government.
The ideal extreme would be the "evil genius" or a lone assassin, whose signature would likely be kept to an absolute minimum through polished tradecraft.
Admittedly, a major difficult for the VNSA in this environment becomes doing anything productive (e.g., raising funds for an operation, recruiting new followers, or actually conducting an attack) without first being flagged as a person of interest. Relocating to isolated mountains or dense jungles may help prevent detection, but doing so would likely hinder the group's ability to harm the U.S. and its allies. Keeping a group small could likewise help avoid detection, whereas a large hierarchical group increases the probability that some member of the group will be flagged, enabling the eventual identification of the other group members. Thus, the "evil genius" -who can plan and execute his attack with minimal assistance from others, and who understands the detection measures and how to circumvent them -perhaps poses the most lethal non-state threat since he is most likely to stay below the detection noise floor while planning his attack.
Obviously, a VNSA's best defense from global strike is to simply avoid detection, thereby breaking the first link in the F2T2EA kill chain. However, the projected advancements in computational and surveillance capabilities make it unlikely that a future VNSA in an urban area can remain invisible indefinitely, unless he forswears illicit behavior -in which case, the U.S. has effectively won by deterring aggression. In the more likely scenario where the VNSA remains committed to his cause, his probability for success is directly dependent on speed. For the evil genius, this means developing his weapon -whether it consists of a cyber-attack against America's banking system or an unmanned aircraft to deploy an aerosolized bio-agent over the superdome -in a disconnected, isolated environment, and not going online until the last possible moment.
What happens after detection? Per AFDD 3-60, the potential target is placed into one of the following four categories once the noise floor has been penetrated: 1) probable timesensitive target, 2) probable non-time-sensitive target, 3) not a target, or 4) unknown; the lower the number, the higher the target priority and the higher the amount of resources dedicated to neutralizing it. 22 Having failed to remain undetected, the VNSA's next opportunity to evade attack is by being classified as a non-target or an unknown. This can perhaps be accomplished by camouflaging one's activities to look non-threatening. For instance, the VNSA that disguises its activities as farming is less likely to be questioned about buying large quantities of diesel fuel and fertilizer.
So You Found Me … But Can You Fix Me?
Now consider the actions a VNSA might employ to break the next link in the F2T2EA kill chain once he has penetrated the noise floor and been identified as a probable target.
According to AFDD 3-60, the second step in the kill chain is the Fix phase, where the targeting cell "positively identifies an emerging target as worthy of engagement and determines its position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement." 23 During this phase, decisions must be made about the prioritization of assets, i.e., does the new person of interest appear to merit the reprioritization of limited resources, or should those resources remain focused on previously-tagged targets? Advancements in sensor technology and data links have already enabled the integration of data from various non-traditional platforms (e.g., targeting pods on fighter aircraft or seeker video from the weapon itself), yielding a "common operating picture that commanders can use to shorten the F2T2EA cycle." 24 Today, this trend is also helping to alleviate resource bottlenecks. By 2035, most -if not all -aircraft and weapons will likely contain similar sensors. This capability, combined with the ubiquitous video environment described above, will make it difficult for the "evil genius" to break this link in the kill chain once he has been flagged as a potential target. however, the challenge with this approach would be accelerating clone aging to match the original's appearance.
Other forms of denial and deception could be orchestrated through the cyber world.
Rather than creating genetic clones, a less radical approach to defeating DNA and fingerprint analyses would be to track down all digital copies of this information, hack into the appropriate servers, and replace the files with those of the body double. Alternatively, one could create hundreds of similar digital personas that amalgamate the biometric data from dozens of people so that, for instance, a fingerprint sample is tied to not one but perhaps 50 different people scattered around the globe. Conflating the data in this manner would, in effect, create even more hay in which to hide the needle. A third approach would be to employ a "botnet," consisting of hundreds of computers that have been silently coopted using malicious code, to fabricate the digital footprints of other, higher-priority persons or events, thereby forcing the reprioritization of tracking resources. Rather than adding more hay to the pile, this approach adds more needles.
The challenge to any of these cyber approaches would be avoiding detection and eliminating any digital footprints that might otherwise result in the restoration of the data using an earlier archived copy.
Target Me If You Dare
According to AFDD 3-60, the Target phase begins once the target has been "identified, classified, located, and prioritized"; the objective of this phase is to finalize the desired effect and targeting solution against it; and to obtain approval to strike. 33 During this process, the target must be assessed for collateral damage potential, in addition to compliance with the combatant commander's rules of engagement and the laws of armed conflict. In a complex targeting scenario, this phase is often the lengthiest "due to the large number of requirements that must be satisfied."
34
A clever VNSA will choose a base of operations that complicates and delays the target approval process. Basing operations in a sovereign country, preferably one that dislikes the U.S., is one way to delay the approval process. Al Qaeda successfully demonstrated this tactic, first in Afghanistan, where the organization was able to operate with near-impunity until the 9/11 attacks, and later in Pakistan, where tenuous relations between Washington and Islamabad, combined with Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, tempered U.S. zeal for attacking terrorist training sites. A host country with a strong military would also help to delay the target approval process, since the host might take exception to a U.S. violation of its territorial sovereignty.
Savvy VNSAs might also base their operations in a location that increases the probability of collateral damage. Such damage often engenders anti-U.S. sentiment among the local populace while creating tension between heads of state, as recent events in Pakistan depict.
According to The Economist, relations between Washington and Islamabad have become "deeply troubled by the issue of drones," with General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff , calling the strike a "complete violation of human rights."
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Another option available to the VNSA in a last-ditch effort to avoid attack is deterrence.
One might threaten to employ nuclear, biological, chemical or other doomsday weapons against the local populace in order to deter a U.S. attack. Alternatively, he might threaten a cyber-attack against U.S. power grids, the banking system, or other pillars of American economic strength. 34 Ibid. Richard A. Clarke, counterterrorism advisor to three previous presidents, claims that logic bombs -malicious code capable of frying the circuits inside power transformers -have been found "all over our electric grid." 36 Clarke also described the financial sector as "particularly vulnerable,"
and ill-prepared to cope with attacks that might shred financial data, causing "unimaginable damage to the economy." 37 Even the 2010 National Security Strategy acknowledges that such threats are among "the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation." 38 Clearly, the U.S. would think twice before striking an enemy capable of executing such attacks.
Finally, any delay in the target approval process gives the VNSA an opportunity to initiate an information campaign. Such campaigns could be tailored to tilt local, regional, or international opinion away from the U.S. They might also be used to create a strategic distraction and domestic political backlash against U.S. leaders. Al Qaeda has already demonstrated that a VNSA can beat us at our own game in this arena. Their sophisticated production companies have produced "high-quality videos…rigorously evaluated for quality control," employing "cutting-edge techniques" that reveal "political savvy and an ability to capitalize on rapidly changing circumstances." 39 Portraying themes of "injustice, suffering, humiliation and the presence of foreigners in Muslim lands," al Qaeda has proven masterful in crafting messages that resonate with its audience.
40

Shoot Me If You Must
During step five of the F2T2EA process (i.e., Engage), the target is confirmed as a "hostile" and the operator is authorized to engage, ideally resulting in "successful action against the target." 41 At this point the U.S. will have completed its cost-benefit analysis and determined that the target is simply too valuable not to strike, despite violations of sovereignty, risk to collateral damage, and threats of counterattacks.
At this point, the non-state actor's options are few, particularly if the weapon of choice is a circa-2035 hypersonic missile. Such weapons, which are now entering early conceptual testing, offer the ability to strike any location on the globe in about an hour. Because of their speed, these weapons would be difficult to defeat with traditional anti-aircraft countermeasures.
One potential option that may be available to non-states in 2035 is deeply buried facilities. Hezbollah has already proved that this is a viable option for VNSAs -at lease for a 
Okay, You Got Me…Or Maybe Not
In the final step of the F2T2EA process (i.e., Assess), ISR assets are employed to "collect information about the engagement…to determine whether desired effects and objectives were achieved" and to determine whether additional strikes are needed to achieve the desired effect on 41 the target. 43 Even at this point in the process, the savvy VNSA may still have a few cards to play.
In the "evil genius" scenario, if the genius survived, he may want to fabricate physical and/or digital evidence indicating otherwise. Alternatively, once safely out of danger, he may want to provide proof of survival as part on an information operation depicting the impotence of America. In the case where the strike terminated the genius, others may want to destroy or discredit evidence of the kill so that they can coopt the genius' persona. Such actions would make confirmation difficult, and perhaps impossible.
Larger non-state groups would also need to assess the impact of the strike, and respond accordingly. This would include reviewing the impact of personnel losses on their organization.
Were the victims the leaders of the movement, or merely the drones? Was anyone captured alive who may be able to compromise other personnel or future operations? Herein lies the advantage of a cellular organization, in which each member can only identify a handful of other members and is only familiar with a few upcoming missions.
They may also conduct an information campaign to further their cause. This could include exploiting any collateral damage to shift worldwide opinion in their favor. As in the case of the evil genius described above, they may want to provide "proof of life," showing the attack did not kill the group's leaders. If the attack was successful, they may want to fabricate this proof. As web searches on such topics as "Osama lives," "9/11 conspiracy," or "alien abductions" prove, a certain segment of the population readily accepts nearly any fringe conspiracy based on the flimsiest of data; VNSAs can leverage this acceptance to keep their cause alive following the loss of a key leader.
Finally, these groups might adapt to better thwart future attacks. This might include going underground -literally and figuratively -until U.S. priorities shift to other targets. 
Conclusions & Implications
The above analysis revealed no guaranteed formula enabling the VNSA to permanently defeat the F2T2EA kill chain in 2035, aside from foreswearing violence altogether. However, delaying the process does appear to be a viable strategy, despite the ubiquity of interconnected computers and sensors in 2035. The most effective strategy is to avoid the initial detection altogether. Because the amount of available information is growing at a faster rate than the computing capacity to process this information, resources dedicated to culling that information will necessarily be focused on people who have already been flagged as a potential threat, as well as certain actions deemed to be potentially threatening, e.g., purchasing large quantities of fuel and fertilizer -common ingredients in homemade bombs, including the one used in the 1995 The savvy VNSA will devise clever methods to sanitize his base of operation from the global web of cameras and computers in 2035, creating an environment where he is safe to plan, prepare for, and perhaps even initiate his illicit activities, while blending into the background noise created the digital personas of billions of interconnected individuals. However, once his signature penetrates this noise floor -either through some action or association with another suspected criminal -evasion becomes a greater challenge. Yes, the VNSA can select a base of operations that slows down the attack approval process due to concerns about sovereignty or collateral damage, and he can employ threats and attacks to temporarily evade the all-seeing eye.
However, once found, odds of thwarting U.S. attack indefinitely appear low, especially if the 2035 suspect has been elevated to the "most wanted" level.
The implication of this study is clear: the key to a successful global strike against a VNSA in 2035 is the intelligence that enables the strike, and not the strike weapon itself. Yes, hypersonic cruise missiles, orbital lasers, intercontinental ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, and "rods from God" could all be effectively employed to take out the non-state. The operator will never get to the "Engage" step without ISR; however, with adequate ISR, many of our current weapons would suffice for striking the VNSA. Consider how the U.S. killed Osama bin Laden: not with an armed Predator, not even with a MK-82 "dumb" bomb, but rather with a pair of 5.56 mm bullets fired from an assault rifle. 48 Even this mission could not have been accomplished without an intelligence source to align the SEAL team shooter's crosshairs with Osama's cranium.
To enable similar missions in the future, the Air Force must continue to invest in a full spectrum of ISR technologies. In terms of sensors, this means that large constellations of small, inexpensive sensors are preferred over fewer, more-expensive systems since the former offers better redundancy. Multi-spectral and wideband capabilities will decrease sensor susceptibility to single-frequency jamming, e.g., laser dazzling. Terrestrial, airborne, and satellite sensors are all needed to build a robust common operating picture.
In terms of ISR processing, a number of key capabilities merit additional research and development funding. Foremost among these is automated pattern recognition logic. This capability will be vital to shifting a greater percentage of the imagery review from man to machine, since the volume of data available to analysts in 2035 is projected to be nearly 8.4
million times than that of today, 49 while growth in the number of human analysts available to review this data is likely to be comparatively negligible. 50 Data fusion, the ability to integrate data from a wide variety of sources and spectra into a single common operating picture, also merits continued investment. Finally, data integrity assurance must also be advanced. No matter how much advancement we make in the pattern recognition and data fusion fields, the results generated by the computers of 2035 will only be as good as the source data used to generate those results.
Ultimately the lethality of America's future global strike capability will only be as good as the intelligence sources that provide the target cueing to the strike weapon. Investment in pattern recognition, data fusion, data integrity, and myriad sensor technologies is vital to ensuring the U.S. can find and kill the bin Ladens of 2035. Should our capabilities in these areas stagnate, tomorrow's adversaries will likely develop clever methods to circumvent them.
find that same needle in a field containing 203 such haystacks. The amount of hay to sort through will have grown so much that the net effect would be a decreased capability to find the needle despite having far more computational horsepower to execute the search.
Could this premise prove incorrect? Absolutely! Perhaps a quantum leap in computer processing power, pattern recognition, or artificial intelligence occurs, shrinking the growth rate of the haystacks. Such developments might even shrink today's single haystack. However, as long as any hay remains, the VNSA still has a potential of escape. Only when all the straw is gone does Osama's protégé cease to have a prayer of evading America's global strike capability.
Ultimately, the actual value of ratio -whether it be 200:1, 1:1, or 1:200 -is somewhat academic with regard to the conclusion of this paper. Osama's 10-year evasion proves today's ISR capabilities have gaps. Whether those gaps grow or shrink and the rate with which they change will be a function of the actions taken between now and 2035. Thus, the Air Force should still continue to invest in the ISR capabilities recommended above as these investments are crucial to inching us closer to the quixotic scenario where the fog of war is lifted and our intelligence is all-knowing.
